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Abstract 
This paper examines an issue that has received considerable comment but little analysis. It has 
often been argued that the presence of the Keiretsu in Japan has been instrumental in deterring 
multinational firms from entering Japan, though evidence for this is patchy. We present some 
new analysis of this issue, thereby evaluating the effects of Keiretsu on inward investment 
penetration in Japan. In contrast to previous work in this area, our results suggest that there is 
little relationship between inward FDI and keiretsu networks, once one controls for 
endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity. In contrast, the results do illustrate some 
important interaction effects between Keiretsu and other explanatory variables that explain 
differences in inward investment penetration.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the networks of horizontal and vertical 
Keiretsu linkages influence the decision for foreign firms entering the Japanese market. While 
most theoretical developments in this area tend to focus on the role of the inward investor as a 
dominant player within the host country, Japan presents a rather different and under-
researched case. Japan’s network of interlocking Keiretsu suggest that for much of Japan’s 
post war history there existed a set of local firms with equal financial and technological 
muscle relative to most potential inward investors. The early literature in this area (Czinkota 
and Kotabe, 2000; Lawrence, 1993a) has suggested that Keiretsu successfully deterred inward 
investment, either directly through their market dominance, or indirectly through their 
influence over government policy towards inward investment. However, the financial crisis in 
Asia and the prolonged recession in Japan has lead to an opening of the Japanese economy, 
and a loosening of Japanese firms’ closely knit business linkages and practices (Paprzycki and 
Fukao, 2008). Various long standing barriers to inward investment were removed, with 
keiretsu and business groups exposed to more intensive foreign competition (Chang, 2006). 
At the same time, the shift to overseas production begun by many Japanese MNEs in the 
1980s has accelerated the so called ‘hollowing out’ process (Bailey, 2003; Bailey and Sugden, 
2007; Sambharya and Banerji, 2006). As a result, the growth in outsourcing has created a 
demand crisis for keiretsu networks, weakening the traditional links between Japan's core 
assemblers and suppliers in vertically linked keiretsu (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000). 
Furthermore, while various financial reformsi by the Japanese government were not directly 
targeted at keiretsu, they have nonetheless resulted in weakening ties among poorly 
performing keiretsu, thereby loosening up reciprocal shareholding among horizontal keiretsu 
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members (Chang, 2006; Lin, 2005). Previously, Japanese firms often colluded with the 
bureaucracy to block foreign competitors, but foreign firms are now increasingly regarded as 
important allies in pressing for structural reform in Japan (Paprzycki and Fukao, 2008). This 
raises the following questions: Does the keiretsu inter-firm network influence the performance 
of inward FDI?  If not, what industrtial structural properties will enhance the impact of 
keiretsu networks on foreign entry? To address these questions, we specifically examine the 
main and moderating effects of horizontal and vertical keiretsu on inward FDI. 
Despite the prevalent view and anecdotal evidence that keiretsu affiliations deter 
foreign penetration in Japan, the empirical literature has by and large found no robust results 
to support this. The available statistical evidence on the role of keiretsu in influencing inward 
FDI is limited, mixed and in most cases contradictory. The evidence that does exist tends to 
be based on cross sectional analysis of highly aggregate data (Ito and Fukao, 2005; Lawrence, 
1993a) and does not distinguish between vertically and horizontally linked keiretsu 
(Weinstein, 1996). This study therefore attempts to fill this gap by developing a model for 
inter-industry variations of inward FDI that incorporates networking of inter-keiretsu firms. 
We argue that the results depend on the networking process of keiretsu-affiliated firms, and 
that these firms constitute a conduit that channels the information diffusion and knowhow in 
the network when the level of ownership and location advantages are high and are therefore  
more likely to be welcoming to inward investors than may have been the case in the past. We 
test this hypothesis using panel data of Japanese manufacturing sectors from 1997-2003. Our 
approach controls for all unobservable sources of heterogeneity and endogeneity, therefore 
our findings also provide methodologically robust evidence.  
 
2. Inward FDI and Keiretsu  
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The dominant paradigm in the analysis of (the lack of) inward investment into Japan has been 
based on analysis of the processes by which Japanese firms manage exchange relationships to 
reduce uncertainty and dependence. Evidence for this is found in the high levels of 
interlocking and overlapping business groups, employing complementary resources such as 
technology, marketing techniques, and distribution systems (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). 
Moreover, if such resources cannot be effectively exploited through the market or arm’s 
length transactions, it would be efficient to integrate into groups. In principle, internal 
organization mitigates problems by allowing firms to better cope with both technological or 
product uncertainty, and market or commercial uncertainty, thereby leading to higher degrees 
of vertical integration in an industry (Wolter and Veloso, 2008). The most advantageous 
aspects of long-term relationships in vertical integration include the frequent mutual exchange 
of information, the ability to set up long-term inventory plans, and the reduction of search 
costs for finding new contractors (Mori, 1994). The incentive of information sharing and 
networking for quality improvement consequently lessens information asymmetries and can 
reduce contracting and monitoring costs (Nagaoka, Takeishi, and Noro, 2008). Vertical 
integration is preferred because tacit knowledge can be more easily appropriated by and 
transferred within a single firm, thereby preventing possible knowledge leakage (Wolter and 
Veloso, 2008).  Opportunism is often controlled by self-enforcing safeguards such as 
relational trust and cross shareholding (stock ownership) between keiretsu members rather 
than legal contracts (Dyer, 1997). The cross shareholding in a Japanese business relationship 
is representative of a credible commitment that one firm has made to another firm (Lincoln 
and Gerlach, 2004). Within close knit keiretsu networks, member firms are often encouraged 
to cooperate and innovate through the sharing of technology and personnel exchanges 
(Cowling and Tomlinson, 2002). In sum, while the initial 'set-up' costs of developing 
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relational trust or cross ownership are high in the short term relative to a legal contract, once 
such self enforcing safeguards are developed, transaction costs (i.e. search, contracting, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs) will decline over the long term. Thus, linkages across 
keiretsu firms are formed by means of commercial and personal ties, mutual board 
representation, cross equity shareholdings, joint business projects, and regular meetings of top 
executives. Nevertheless, whilst many firms in Japan have close links with a main bank and 
extensive ties with their suppliers and distributors, the formality, depth, and breadth of these 
ties, differ depending on whether the firm belongs to horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu, or 
is an independent firm (Dewenter, Novaes, and Pettway, 2001). Horizontal keiretsu are groups 
of affiliated firms that span numerous and unrelated industries that are "centred" around a 
financial institution (i.e. a commercial bank). In contrast, vertical keiretsu are organised 
around a core firm (i.e. dominant manufacturing assemblers) with links along supply and 
distribution networks that generally operate within one industry (Sambharya and Banerji, 
2006), where intermediate goods and services are supplied through an extensive use of 
vertical subcontracting arrangements (Coffey and Tomlinson, 2003). A core firm plays a 
leading role as an apex of a hierarchical system and a spider of an industrial web, controlling 
large production and technological value added activities through upstream and downstream 
supply chains (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). This type of hierarchical network of inter-firm 
organizational structure is prevalent in the consumer electronics (i.e. Toshiba, Panasonic) and 
the automotive industries (i.e. Toyota, Honda). Under rigorous internal control mechanism 
established,  by for example,  in Toyota’s logistical chains, most manufactured inputs are 
produced by independent suppliers with guaranteed price, quality levels, and prompt delivery 
of strategic components (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). In particular, Japan’s automobile 
industry has the largest number of vertical linkages sustaining highly dependent and cohesive 
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relationships within the network of clusters (Coffey and Tomlinson, 2003). Toyota and other 
assemblers similarly developed industrial districts - clusters of a hierarchical supply system, 
which are comprised of agglomerations of their suppliers located within a range of 100km of 
a central city, or  so called “company castle town”, thereby allowing the assemblers to 
exercise their market power (Whittaker, 1997). Ultimately, the internal cohesion of vertical 
keiretsu network is much stronger than that of horizontal keiretsu network. 
 
The keiretsu relationship creates informational and transactional efficiencies across the 
boundaries of member firms (Lin, 2005). These practices provide inherent cost of capital 
advantages and reduce the transaction costs for keiretsu member firms relative to those of 
outsiders. There are also possible efficiency gains through better information exchange, 
coordination, and monitoring that can outweigh the implicit costs of maintaining in-group 
preferences. Keiretsu affiliated firms also have privileged access to internal resources 
controlled by other members, thereby reducing resource constraints and the vulnerability of 
market fluctuations and stimulating firm growth. 
In turn, this perspective along with more general cultural distance has provided the 
framework by which analysis based on transaction costs has explained the low levels of 
inward investment into Japan. The extant literature emphasizes that by performing the roles of 
internal markets, the keiretsu system serves as an efficient monitoring mechanism that can 
mitigate various agency problems (Kim, Hoskisson, and Wan, 2004). According to 
conventional industrial organisation theory, MNEs that engage in international production 
face a “liability of foreignness or newness” (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992), which 
arises from unfamiliarity with the host country’s environment. They might be at a 
disadvantage when investing in locations where such a liability impedes their access to local 
resources in the host country (Garg and Delios, 2007). Further, stable inter-corporate equity 
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holdings also act as a takeover defence by normalising group relationships, thereby making it 
difficult for foreign firms to enter Japan through acquisitions.  
This dominant paradigm of the analysis of inward investment into Japan has found 
support from small sample survey and statistical evidence, which suggests that the presence of 
keiretsu networks can create informal barriers by facilitating collusion to restrict the market 
access of foreign firms (Czinkota and Kotabe, 2000; Lawrence, 1991; Lawrence, 1993b; 
Lawrence, 1993a). Lawrence (1993a) found that the share of both horizontal and vertical 
keiretsu firms in industry sales has a significant and negative effect on the market share of 
foreign-affiliated firms. Similarly, Weinstein (1996) finds a negative effect of horizontal 
keiretsu presence on inward FDI. However, the result is sensitive to different model 
specifications and is not robust enough to suggest that keiretsu presence deters foreign 
penetration. Nakamura et al.(1995) and  Ito and Fukao (2005) do not find any evidence to 
support the collusion hypothesis raised originally in Lawrence (1993a), and therefore 
conclude that keiretsu presence is not a factor that influences the share of foreign participation. 
However, much of this literature is based on purely cross sectional analysis of broad industry 
groups, and is therefore unable to allow for unobservable heterogeneity across sectors, see for 
example (Ito and Fukao, 2005; Lawrence, 1993a; Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya, 1995).  
Keiretsu networks can create informal barriers by facilitating collusion to restrict the 
market access of foreign firms (Lawrence 1991; Lawrence 1993a; Lawrence 1993b; Czinkota 
and Kotabe 2000). However, the econometric evidence to date is limited and contradictory. 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) provide evidence that it is fierce competition, not collusion, 
among keiretsu members that reduce entry of foreign and domestic firms into sectors where 
keiretsu are dominant. Further, developments in Keiretsu networking have led to greater links 
with global supply chains, and the use of Keiretsu in promoting cooperation between MNEs 
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and indigenous firms (Belderbos and Carre, 2002; Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; 
Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten, 2005). We therefore propose that there may be different channels 
through which keiretsu membership influences FDI decisions than those investigated in the 
literature. Prior studies also suffer from a significant shortcoming. They investigate only the 
main or direct effects between keiretsu presence and FDI, but do not fully explore where 
Keiretsu may fit into the wider theoretical analysis of FDI. It is important to recognize that 
ownership and location specific factors are embedded in keiretsu networks, and therefore that 
such considerations must inform empirical models. As discussed above, Keiretsu are 
conceptualised as networking and information sharing devices that may also be an attractive 
feature of a location for inward investors. Better analysis of this will improve understanding 
of business relations between keiretsu and foreign firms from an alternative theoretical 
perspective.  
It is also informative to consider here the alternative modes of servicing a foreign 
market. Potential inward investors can of course eschew servicing the market through FDI, 
and export. One would expect that links between exporters and Keiretsu will be much weaker 
than links between inward investors and Keiretsu, such that any information sharing or 
beneficial effects to either party through location advantages will not be realised by exporters. 
On the other hand, the deterrence effects of Keiretsu are still present, and may deter potential 
exporters from entering the Japanese market.  
 
 
Network Perspectives on FDI 
Whilst a traditional view of FDI focuses on internalisation of firm specific assets, a network 
perspective on FDI highlights the exploitation of network resources for internationalisation 
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(Chen, 2003; Chen, Chen, and Ku, 2004; Eng, 2007). Network resources are broadly 
categorised as follows: (1) inputs such as labour, capital, and raw materials, (2) intermediate 
product knowledge such as technology and operational know-how (3) markets, including 
distribution channels and buyer-supplier relationships (Guillen, 2000). The local presence is 
valuable to build trust and relationships in a foreign network, and a network may provide 
access to the flow of information content or distinctive resources that are not available in an 
investors’ domestic market. Foreign MNEs can therefore utilise diverse and idiosyncratic 
network resources such as skilled labour, marketing, managerial expertise and technology 
during the process of internationalisation. In essence, basic resources such as unskilled labour 
and natural resources can be accessed through arm’s length transaction from a home base 
without substantial international networking effort. By contrast, strategic network resources 
are inimitable and require considerable integration and coordination effort with a local 
network. If strategic assets are available in the host economy, then a foreign investor may 
develop R&D facilities, supply/procure components and parts, and build distribution channels 
by resource sharing. Business relationships can be preserved, maintained, and enhanced 
through internationalisation of firms within a network by inducing inter-corporate and intra-
corporate linkages (Chen, Chen, and Ku, 2004). As such, FDI can be regarded as an effort by 
investors to develop linkages with local networks by establishing a presence in the foreign 
country. The network relationship established between firms through resource exchange and 
coordination therefore enables investors to gain economies of scale and scope (Eng, 2007). 
Assimilation and consolidation of leveraged external resources in a global setting are 
increasingly important since expanding into new product and international markets requires 
significant commitment of new resources (Kim, Hoskisson, and Wan, 2004).  
FDI in local linkages not only develops a platform for foreign based activities but may also 
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generate positive spillovers to the host economy (Chen, Chen, and Ku, 2004). There is a large 
literature on the benefits of linkages between inward investors and domestic firms, but 
perhaps the better analogy is the relationship between inward investors and pre-existing 
clusters of activity. De Propris and Driffield (2006) for example show that mutual gains in 
productivity are made by inward investors and domestic firms where an inward investment 
links with a pre-existing cluster. This suggests that in the context of Keiretsu, the more local 
linkages that a foreign firm creates with keiretsu the greater the benefits to both the inward 
investor and host country firms. Such network relationships reduce transaction costs and 
facilitate knowledge sharing, in the form of product innovations. De Propris et al.(2005) 
demonstrates that a local industrial system characterised by a cluster of highly specialised 
domestic firms that possess competitive advantages induces FDI into both high and low tech-
manufacturing industries in Italy. Luo et al (2002) also point out that local networking, in the 
forms of linkages that foreign invested firms establish with domestic firms in the local market, 
greatly mitigate the liability of foreignness in China. Cluster participation reduces the relative 
unfamiliarity of foreign owned establishments operating in the foreign market by formal or 
informal knowledge exchange and transfer. Keiretsu share broadly similar features with 
cluster networks and Marshallian industrial districts in terms of networking and information 
sharing (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000; Ozawa, 2003; Whittaker, 1997). The agglomeration 
effect of FDI is the result of vigorous local networking and linkages inducing new network 
partners. MNEs are regarded as an inter-organisational network embedded in a web of 
external networks consisting of buyers, suppliers, competitors, and regulators (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1990). FDI involves a long-term business transaction where interactions take place 
not only between the headquarters in home base and their subsidiaries but also between 
subsidiaries and indigenous firms. Thus, when extensive transnational networking is 
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undertaken from a home base without a local presence, building up new relationships in a 
foreign country can be costly (Chen, 2003).  
Blonigen et al (2005) investigate the networking and information sharing effects that Keiretsu 
can have on the FDI decisions of Japanese firms. They find that horizontal keiretsu firms who 
hold President Club membership have a greater probability of engaging in FDI through 
mutual learning. This result can be extended to highlight the attractiveness of such sectors for 
inward investors, where such learning and networking effects can be a source of location 
advantages. Without networking with keiretsu members, foreign firms may find it difficult to 
obtain market information or to muster resources to make optimal decisions in expanding into 
the unfamiliar markets. Inter-firms networks have led to a rise in the recognition that networks  
contribute significantly to competitive, advantage, and that this includes interactions between 
inward investors and domestic firms. As Dyer and Hatch (2006) point out, firms are 
increasingly relying on network resources to gain access to diverse and complementary 
resources and knowledge that are not available internally. Various ownership and location 
tenets can notably influence the level of FDI activities, whilst the network architecture of 
keiretsu may also differentially interact with different dimensions of such sectoral attributes. 
Depending on the level and types of ownership and location attributes, inter firm network of 
keiretsu could have a greater or lesser relevance in FDI performance. For example, intensity 
of keiretsu affiliations with high level of ownership and location advantages facilitate the 
search and transfer of tacit and complex knowledge, therefore enabling foreign firms to 
combine with their existing knowledge sets, whilst preserving information transmission 
advantage from keiretsu clusters. The compositional quality of keiretsu networking and 
sectoral advantages enables a wide range of information to be exchanged and integrated 
efficiently, leading to greater multinational activity. We therefore posit that the entry of 
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foreign firms in both horizontal and vertical keiretsu dominated sectors where diverse and 
rich information is available, enabling them to access a wide range of localized network 
resources, will be conditioned on the level of ownership and location specific attributes. In 
sum, this literature suggests the following hypotheses: 
Firstly, that horizontal and vertical Keiretsu interact differently with FDI. Horizontal Keiretsu 
attract inward investors through the network effects, while vertical Keiretsu deter inward 
investors through entry barriers. 
Secondly, that the interaction between keiretsu networks and ownership/location are important 
in explaining FDI.  Consistent with the symmetrical nature of interactions, we expect that the 
effect of keiretsu dominance on FDI will be positive as the level of ownership and location 
advantages increases. Specifically, Keiretsu in sectors with significant scale economies may 
seek to ally their market power with inward investor’s firm specific advantage. 
However, a network of vertical Keiretsu may also form an entry barrier, preventing inward 
investment from forming linkages with domestic firms, and acquiring necessary inputs locally.  
The analysis of Girma (2002) or Driffield (2001) is informative here, in explaining links 
between entry barriers and entry decisions by inward investors. They show that where 
significant entry barriers have hitherto prevented entry, leading to high levels of concentration, 
only inward investors with sufficient ownership advantages to overcome these barriers are 
attracted to these sectors. This suggests that interactions between Keiretsu and entry barriers 
or location advantages are important for explaining inward investment.  
In order to explore this further, we contrast the impact of Keiretsu on inward investment 
penetration, with import penetration. There are a number of reasons for doing this. Firstly, the 
FDI decision does not take place in isolation from alternatives, notably exporting from 
another location. Secondly, our underlying premise is that while Keiretsu do indeed form a 
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barrier to entry in general, but that under certain circumstances network effects overcome this. 
Our third hypothesis then concerns the relationship between Keiretsu and imports. The 
network effects between importers and Keiretsu are unlikely to be significant, such that the 
entry barrier effect will dominate, and Keiretsu presence will be negatively related to import 
penetration into Japan.  
3. The Model and Data  
 
The Model 
 
This model builds on the work of Girma (2002) which was developed from the entry literature. 
There are many studies of the determinants of entry, dating back to Orr (1974). Orr’s work 
stimulated more formal models of entry, many of which are summarised in Geroski (1995), 
and Seigfreid and Evans (1994). This is then adapted to model FDI flows at the sectoral level, 
building on Driffield (2002) and Driffield and Munday (2000), which are both based on a 
standard empirical specification of Dunning’s (1979) paradigm. The underlying assumption is 
that while a multinational’s ability to develop and sustain competitive advantage would be 
positively related to the FDI decision, certain host country phenomena are also important. 
This was originally specified simply in terms of revealed comparative advantage and 
openness (Maskus and Webster, 1995; Milner and Pentecost, 1996). However, this has 
subsequently been extended, building on the entry literature of Rosenbaum and Lamort 
(1992), Shapiro and Khemani(1987) to incorporate host country entry conditions as 
determinants of inward investment, see for example Driffield (2001) or Neven and Siotis 
(1993).  We therefore extend this model to include factors that are likely to influence  FDI, 
such as a dominant set of indigenous inter-firm networks of keiretsu. We can operationalise 
this approach by expressing inward foreign investment as in the dynamic panel model below.  
Thus, FDI is a function of past FDI, and various industry characteristics, which serve as 
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proxies for ownership and location advantage respectively.  
ittiitkitkitktiit VKHKXFDIFDI   1,0      (1) 
where itFDI  is the level of inward FDI flows measured as the sales share accounted for by 
the foreign subsidiary in the corresponding sub-sector  i  in year t . 1itFDI is the level of FDI 
lagged by one year. itX  denotes the observable vector of regressors that explain inter-industry 
variations of foreign involvement in year t  to control for systematic differences in industry 
structure. HK and VK are measures of the intensity of financial centred horizontal keiretsu 
and the concentration ratio of manufacturing centred vertical keiretsu, respectively. Factors 
typically associated with the attraction of FDI, include advertising intensity (AD), capital 
labour intensity (KL), R&D intensity (RD), and economies of scale (SCALE). These 
variables are typically associated with the ability of firms to generate ownership advantage, 
see for example Driffield (2002). Various location specific advantages and disadvantages 
include domestic market size (MSIZE), openness to trade (OPEN), revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA), and regulations on inward FDI (REG). j is an industry dummy to capture 
industry effects and t a time dummy aimed at capturing shocks over time that are common to 
all firms. Finally, it  represents the error term. We estimate specifications testing our 
hypothesis with regard to whether the effects of keiretsu networks (VK or HK) in given 
sectors on inward FDI are moderated by a set of sectoral attributes. The rationale behind the 
inclusion of multiplicative terms is that keiretsu on their own may not be sufficient to 
influence the investment decision of foreign MNEs, but may have a moderating effect on FDI. 
Thus, it is possible that the keiretsu may not have an impact in isolation from other industry 
level phenomena. Accordingly, an interactive model is likely to be necessary to capture the 
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conditional relationship, that is, the effects of keiretsu intensity on FDI vary according to the 
level and types of location and ownership specific tenets.  
In order to allow for the fact that FDI is not the only mechanism for servicing a foreign 
market, we also consider the FDI model in the context of exporting by multinationals into 
Japan. We therefore set up a simultaneous panel data model, where we also specify a model 
examining the relationship between these control variables and imports into Japan.  
ittiitkitkitktiit uVKHKZMM    1,0      (2) 
where itM  is import penetration in industry i at time t, Z is a subset of the X variables, 
discussed above, omitting open-ness and revealed comparative advantage, as they are trade-
based measures. 
 
The data  
Our analysis covers 40 Japanese manufacturing sectors at the ‘three-digit’ level for the period 
1997-2003. This is the maximum level of disaggregation for which the available data can be 
consistently matched over time. An appendix details the data sources used in our analysis. The 
main data set used in this study is based on the results of the Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structures and Activities from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
This survey is one of the few official sources containing information on foreign affiliate firms 
in the Japanese economy and enables us to construct consistent panel data for the sectoral 
analysis. 
Measurement of variables 
Table 1 summarises the variables used in the empirical analysis along with the descriptive 
statistics. All monetary values are converted to real terms using the Corporate Goods Price 
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Index (an equivalent to the PPI) to adjust for inflation.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Dependent Variables 
Inward FDI is measured as sales share accounted for by foreign affiliated firms and is 
employed as our dependent variable. A large share of affiliate sales in the manufacturing 
sector in Japan is likely to consist of sales of services rather than of productionii of goods per 
se. The sales measure is therefore well linked with not only production of goods but also with 
knowledge diffusion of superior product and marketing or distribution activities. Import 
penetration is similarly measured with industry level data on the ratio of imports to gross 
ouput.   
Keiretsu Network Variables 
Keiretsu variables are our primary interest and are meant to serve as proxies for information 
sharing and networking effects in respective sectors. Keiretsu membership is not clearly 
definable since there are no agreed criteria that classify a firm as a member. The criteria used 
to define the boundaries and to identify the members of keiretsu vary considerably across 
studies because of the informality of group membership. Following previous empirical studies 
(Kimura and Pugel 1995; Ueda and Sasaki 1998; Sakakibara and Serwin 2000; Nakamura 
2002; Dewenter 2003; Blonigen et al. 2005b), horizontal keiretsu (HK) in this study are 
defined as firms that hold membership of the Presidents’ Club of so called ‘Big Six’iii - Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and DKB. This is perhaps the narrowest and most 
restrictive definition of horizontal keiretsu, in which only the “core members” of each group 
are listed. The members iv  of Presidents' Clubs consist of representatives of the largest 
companies closely affiliated with each of the Six keiretsu, which are comprised of city banks, 
trust banks, insurance companies, general trading firms, and major manufacturing firms from 
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unrelated industries. The city bank, or "main bank", of each of the Six often acts as a principle 
lender and a major shareholder to most of the affiliated non-financial members and provides 
not only long term credit finance but also potential market and business information. 
Executives of those club members participate once a month in the CEO meeting to share and 
exchange such information, and therefore Presidents’ clubs take an essential role as a 
coordination mechanism (Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten, 2005; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). 
This aims to gather resources benefiting the firm from other member firms represented by the 
CEOs  as the strategic use of friendship networks. Horizontal keiretsu intensity is measured 
using the sales share accounted for by the member firms of the Presidents’ Club. Keiretsu 
firms that did not appear in the data source for seven consecutive years due to bankruptcy or 
market exit are excluded from the sample.  
Vertically organised keiretsu (VK) data are taken from Corporate Groupings in Japan, as 
detailed in table 1. This focuses on the dominance of firms from the electric machinery and 
motor vehicles sectors. Sambharya and Banerji (2006) and Kimura and Pugel (1995) argue 
that electronics and motor vehicle manufacturers occupy the central and dominant positions 
among vertical keiretsu system. Resource and information flows are channelled from core 
firms at the hub of vertical keiretsu to various other members of the keiretsu. These industries 
need to extensively rely on knowledge-intensive collaboration in order to increase 
technological and economic returns and to better exploit their resources and competences. 
Estimation 
 
Equations (1) and (2) represent dynamic specifications of models explaining FDI and trade 
flows at the sectoral level, similar to that presented in Driffield (1999) or Girma (2002) The 
standard approach to this would be to employ a first difference model, in the spirit of 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991).  However, in this context there 
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may be an additional complication. The decision to engage in FDI or exports does not exist in 
isolation, but rather one may consider that a firm seeking to enter the Japanese market directly 
has to decide between exporting and FDI. Thus, one has to allow for simultaneity between 
exporting and FDI. In estimation terms this presents a problem. One cannot simply estimate 
(1) and (2) using a standard three stage least squares estimator, as by construction the i and 
i  terms are correlated with each other, as well as with the lagged dependent variable in each 
case, by construction. One therefore has to remove the fixed effect through differencing. The 
first-differenced versions of the equations are therefore estimated simultaneously via iterated 
three stage least squares (FD-3SLS), following an approach developed by Cornwell et al 
(1992), and explained in more detail in Driffield and Girma (2004)v.  
 
4. Results  
 
Table 2 sets out the results from the simultaneous equation estimation, with FDI and imports 
as the dependent variables. This is based on the 40 manufacturing sectors in our sample for 
the period 1997-2003.  
[Table 2 about here] 
We start by presenting the baseline model, and subsequrntly explore interactions between 
Keiretsu and the other explanatory variables. The baseline model is presented in column (1) 
with the full set of interaction terms included in the second model in column 2. For 
completeness, the exporting model (when estimated with the baseline model) is included in 
column 3. Our main focus is on the FDI models, though we discuss the export equation below. 
The control variables all have the expected signs. Consistent with Driffield and Munday 
(2000), the variables associated with the ability to generate ownership advantages, R&D, 
advertising and capital intensity are positively associated with FDI, while measures of 
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location advantages, such as market size and openness and regional agglomeration are also 
positive.  The negative coefficients relate to the competitiveness of the domestic sector (RCA), 
and there is significant evidence that in the context of servicing the Japanese market, 
exporting and FDI are substitutes. The coefficient on the regulation variable (REG) is 
statistically significant, but has a counter intuitive positive sign. A possible explanation is that 
significant structural change took place in Japanese industry after the burst of the bubble 
economy. Such regulated sectors traditionally had very high institutional entry barriers, and as 
a result, the scope for domestic entry was limited.  However, if institutional entry barriers 
have declined, international firms may now be looking to exploit their ownership advantages 
in Japan.   
 
Turning to the main variables of interest, the Keiretsu variables, these results suggest that 
horizontal Keiretsu are positively associated with inward FDI. Such previous literature as 
there is in this does not find this result, but employs either standard fixed effects estimation 
(Weinstein, 1996), or OLS (Ito and Fukao, 2005; Lawrence, 1993a). This is rather limited, 
especially when one considers the inherent endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity in 
models of FDI.  Vertical Keiretsu by contrast do demonstrate a negative effect, but this is 
insignificant. These results highlight the importance of not merely focussing on Keiretsu, as 
much of the previous literature has done, but to differentiate between vertical Keiretsu and 
horizontal Keiretsu. In the same context, it is also informative that while horizontal Keiretsu 
are associated with an increase of FDI penetration, both forms are strongly associated with 
forming a barrier to import penetration. As such, as the previous literature has suggested, 
Keiretsu do indeed form a deterrent to foreign competition in Japan, but for the reasons 
discussed above, horizontal Keiretsu engage with, rather than compete with inward investors.  
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Of potentially more interest is the model with the interaction terms. The coefficients on the 
Keiretsu terms are robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms, as are all the control 
variables. In the presence of significant interaction terms, the estimated coefficients for HK 
and VK in this model are simple or constituent effects rather than true main effects as the 
main effects lose meaning (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). An interaction takes place when the 
effect of one variable is significantly moderated by another variable. The "main effects" and 
"interaction effect" in a multiplicative model in no instance represent a constant effect of an 
independent variable on the dependent variable. The structure of keiretsu network conveys a 
positive effect on FDI flows, with realisation of scale economies being the major mitigating 
factor. Industries with significant scale economies, and Keiretsu, are more likely to attract 
inward investment. Distinctive network resources and capital developed by horizontal 
keiretsu advance the process of FDI by providing investing firms with essential market 
information to gain efficiencies and opportunities to establish local linkages to reduce the 
risks of undertaking FDI (Eng, 2007). Overall, the results suggest that market entry barriers 
are also circumvented through such local network resources. In terms of network accessibility, 
firms increasingly undertake FDI not only to exploit but also to augment their firm specific 
advantages or to acquire necessary strategic assets (i.e. technology, marketing, and managerial 
expertise) available in a foreign market (Dunning, 2000; Dunning, 1995). The underlying 
rational is that firm specific assets are developed through the capacity of investing firms to 
acquire and efficiently coordinate complementary resources possessed by other firms in a host 
country (Makino, Lau, and Yeh, 2002). A firm therefore chooses a particular investment 
location in which required strategic resources owned by indigenous firms are available to help 
develop firm specific advantages. Blonigen et al (2005) show that mutual learning effects in 
horizontal keiretsu are more significant than in vertical keiretsu.vi. An extensive keiretsu 
 21
network in unrelated business sectors provide heterogeneity of knowledge distributed across 
clusters acts as a vehicle for information and knowledge transfer, and takes an intermediary 
role in the relationship building between Japanese and foreign firms, therefore facilitating 
more investment. This can be extended to highlight the learning and networking effects as a 
valuable source of location advantages through interactions with Keiretsu. The positive 
moderating effects are also explained by our sample, which was derived from a “more open” 
period 1997-2003, where Japan started to be more welcoming toward inward FDI 
Existing survey evidence (Czinkota and Kotabe, 2000) suggests that strong production 
and distribution networks, closely linked and captured by VK, deter foreign penetration. 
Girma (2002) or Driffield (2001) also show that where significant entry barriers have hitherto 
prevented entry, leading to high levels of concentration, only inward investors with sufficient 
ownership advantages to overcome these barriers are attracted to these sectors.  
Model 2 highlights the importance of interaction between Keiretsu and certain location 
advantages that the sector possesses. R&D intensive horizontal Keiretsu are less likely to 
attract inward investors, as firm specific advantage coupled with a strong network is less 
likely to either need investment from abroad to provide new technology, or be attractive for 
inward investors seeking to compete in new markets. In contrast, sectors with significant scale 
economies and Keiretsu are attractive to inward investors, seeking collaborations between 
new technology and efficient local production scale..  
Finally, model three highlights the differences between Inward FDI and imports in terms 
of the explanatory variables. Of specific interest are the Keiretsu terms, and it is noticeable 
that Keiretsu deter entry by importers to a far greater extent than they do inward investors. 
This is also indicative that one of the principle reasons why Keiretsu do not deter inward 
investment to the extent that it might be imagined, is because of the additional networking or 
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collaboration opportunities that inward investment presents. Clearly importers offer merely 
increased competition, and are deterred by Keiretsu.  
5. Conclusions  
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the main and moderating effects of 
keiretsu networking on inward FDI across Japanese manufacturing sectors at the three-digit 
level during the period of 1997-2003 using a panel data set. Our results demonstrate that 
networking and information sharing effects of keiretsu and FDI are significantly moderated 
by ownership and location specific attributes and depend on the structure and type of linkage 
affiliations involved. However, there is no evidence of keiretsu presence deterring foreign 
entry, once one allows for persistence and endogeneity. Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) assert 
that the reason for conflicting results with regard to keiretsu impact is due to the changing 
nature of keiretsu boundaries and the multiplex nature of keiretsu ties. Whilst the diversified 
horizontal linked keiretsu combined with ownership and location advantages has positive 
moderating impacts on the foreign sales, the effect of vertical supply chains is mixed, placing 
some limitations on potential global network building. Our statistical results suggest that 
ownership factors associated with marketing skills, capital intensity and scale economies in 
the industrial sector dominated by horizontal keiretsu positively influence the sales activities 
of foreign firms. Furthermore, there is evidence that both horizontal and vertical keiretsu 
network facilitated by location advantages are likely to induce inward FDI. In contrast, 
increased capital and knowledge intensity with vertically organised keiretsu is negatively 
correlated with foreign sales penetration. This suggests that increased capitalisation and 
technological knowledge coupled with intra-industry supply chains in Japan acts as an entry 
barrier to inward FDI.  
Finally, some important policy implications can be drawn from our empirical results. 
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Japan’s inward investment climate could be much improved by an increased understanding of 
the interactive relationship between industry attributes and network linkages of keiretsu 
affiliations. Liberalising and limiting market power and rigid control in certain areas, 
particularly in regards to the capital and knowledge intensive activities of the vertical supply 
chain is likely to be an effective policy for inducing foreign penetration. There is perhaps a 
need to monitor closely keiretsu activities so that affiliated group firms do not engage in 
exclusionary practices or exert monopoly control in the market. The current impression given 
in public discourse is that dealing with keiretsu following entry into the Japanese market is 
difficult and challenging. Clearly, the Japanese government needs to maximise its efforts to 
improve the overall image of Japan as an investment destination, and counter its perception as 
a market that remains relatively closed to foreign entrants. Effective public relations activities 
and dedicated policy measures are required to create a better perception of the investment 
climate faced by potential foreign investors.  
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Table 1: Variables Definition, and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Name Definition Description Mean S. D. 
FDI Foreign presence 
measured by the 
share of sales 
Sales of foreign firms / Total industry 
sales in sectors 
0.044 0.079
AD Advertising 
intensity 
Advertising expenditures / Total 
industry sales 
19.469 19.716
KL Capital to  labour 
intensity 
Tangible assets / Total employment 0.022 0.022
RD R&D intensity R&D expenditures / Total industry 
sales 
0.009 0.010
REG Regulation Weighted index of government 
regulations in a given sector, ranging 
between 0 and 1. 0 for the weakest and 
1 for strongest restrictions. 
0.260 0.358
MSIZE Domestic market 
size 
Gross Output + Net Import (in 
logarithm) 
16.152 0.952
SCALE Economies of 
scale 
Average value added per establishment 
accounting for the upper half of 
industry value added divided by the 
total value added in all establishments 
0.0010 
 
 
0.0017
OPEN Openness to trade  (Real net exports + Real net 
imports)/Real gross output  
2.747 2.060
RCA Revealed industry 
comparative 
advantage 
(Real net exports - real net imports)/ 
(real net exports + real net imports) 
-0.160 0.522
IMPORT Import Real net imports/Real gross output  1.579 
 
1.655
PROFIT Industry 
profitability 
(Real gross output – material –labour –
capital cost) / real gross output 
-0.077  0.263
HK Intensity of 
Horizontal 
Keiretsu 
Share of sales by Horizontal Keiretsu 
firms that belong to President Clubs 
from the BIG SIX (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and DKB) 
corporate groups. 
0.212 0.245
VK Top eight firm 
concentration ratio 
by Vertical 
Keiretsu 
The proportion of industry sales 
accounted for by sales to the largest 
eight firms in Keiretsu Dominated 
Sectors 
0.069 
 
0.202 
To account for inflation, all monetary values (millions of Japanese yen) are adjusted to real 
terms using Corporate Goods Price Index (2000=100). S.D. denotes standard deviation. 
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Table 2:  Three Stage Least Squares of FDI and Trade Models 
 
FDI models Trade model 
(1) (2) (3) 
coefficient T value  coefficient T value  coefficient T value  
Constant -0.09  -10.73 -0.09 -8.72 -6.43  -13.00 
FDI (t-1) 0.34  4.34 0.29 4.44 
IMPORTS(t-1) 0.71  4.78 
AD 0.85  2.42 0.69 2.22 0.57  4.21 
KL 0.002  10.73 0.002 11.57 -0.18  -0.16 
SCALE 0.52  1.39 0.54 1.32 0.50  4.08 
RD 0.89  11.20 0.85 10.15 0.19  3.36 
REG 0.02  2.59 0.03 2.66 0.58  4.08 
MSIZE 0.001  9.20 0.0005 9.89 -0.33  -6.80 
OPEN 0.01  3.67 0.01 3.83 
RCA -0.02  -2.38 -0.02 -2.54 
HK 0.01  2.91 0.01 2.52 -0.50  -4.48 
VK -0.13  1.07 -0.11 1.12 -0.42  -4.50 
PROFIT 0.002  0.15 0.002 0.13 0.15 1.45
IMPORTS -0.73  -7.96 -0.61 -8.27 
FDI -0.56  3.66 
HK*AD 0.45 2.51 
HK*KL 0.002 0.001 
HK*SCALE 0.70 3.30 
HK*RD -0.38 1.94 
HK*REG 0.01 0.07 
HK*MSIZE 0.09 0.02 
HK*OPEN 0.01 0.01 
HK*RCA 0.23 0.06 
VK*AD 0.08 0.13 
VK*KL -0.0001 0.00005 
VK*SCALE 7.81 2.53 
VK*RD -0.04 0.02 
VK*REG -0.0004 0.002 
VK*MSIZE 0.001 0.001 
VK*OPEN 0.001 0.0001 
VK*RCA     0.01 0.002     
Rsq (adj) 0.78 (0.73) 0.87 (0.74) 0.67 (0.62) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
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Variable Name Data Sources 
FDI, AD, KL, 
RD, SCALE 
Heisei 9~15 Nen Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa Hokokusyo: Sogo 
Tokeihyo (Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure 
and Activities 1998~2004: Volume 1 Summary Report) from 
Research and Statistics Department, Economic and Industrial Policy 
Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
REG Indices for regulation for 1997~2002 are taken from Japan Industrial 
Productivity (JIP) Database 2006 from Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, Incorporated Administrative Agency 
(RIETI). Index for 2003 are constructed similar manner as JIP 
Database using ' Kisei Kanwa Hakusyo' (White Paper on Public 
Regulations) from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications.  
MSIZE Data for 1997~2002 are taken from Japan Industrial Productivity 
(JIP) Database 2006 from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, Incorporated Administrative Agency (RIETI). Gross output 
for 2003 is taken from Linked Input Output table from METI and Net 
import for 2003 is from JIP Database. 
OPEN, RCA, 
IMPORT, 
PROFIT 
Trade (export, import, gross outputs) and profit (material, labour, and 
capital costs) data for 1997~2003 are taken from Japan Industrial 
Productivity (JIP) Database 2010 from Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, Incorporated Administrative Agency 
(RIETI).  
HK The list of Shyacho-Kai (President Club) membership by Big Six 
financial keiretsu is taken from two sources: "Kigyo Keiretsu Soran 
1999 and 2000" (Corporate Affiliations) from Toyo Keizai 
Shinposhya and "Kigyo Syudan no Jittai ni tsuite - Dai 6~7 ji Cyosa 
Hokokusyo" (Research on Industrial Groupings: 6~7-th Survey) from 
Japan Fair Trade Commission. The members of the Big Six were 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and DKB, but these 
keiretsu were merged to the Big Four (Mitsubishi, Mitsui-Sumitomo, 
Mizuho and UFJ) during 1999 to 2002. Sales data of each member 
firm are collected from "Yukashoken Hokokusyo" (Annual Securities 
Report) using EDINET (Electronic Disclosure for Investors' 
Network) of Financial Services Agency, The Japanese Government. 
VK Sourced from "Sales Ranking" from Money & Market Nikkei Net 
and "Nippon no Kigyo Gurupu 2003" (Corporate Groupings in Japan) 
from Toyo Keizai Shinposhya. Sales data are also collected and 
checked from "Yukashoken Hokokusyo" (Annual Securities Report) 
using EDINET (Electronic Disclosure for Investors' Network) of 
Financial Services Agency, The Japanese Government. 
CGPI The corporate goods price index (2000=100) is sourced  from Bank 
of Japan data. 
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i The financial system has generally been reformed to facilitate an environment of mergers and acquisitions 
in Japan. Changes in the accounting system have lead to a requirement to disclose the value of equity 
holdings at market value. This has resulted in massive sales of shares by bank centred keiretsu, and a 
stringent requirement for consolidation, making it difficult for firms to manage their earnings by allocating 
gains and losses among keiretsu group members. 
ii Many foreign firms that are categorised as manufacturing companies are, in fact, associated with service 
and distribution activities rather than production per se. 
iii Between 1999 and 2002, the Big Six were merged to the Big Four (Mitsubishi, Mitsui-Sumitomo, 
Mizuho and UFJ) following  major restructuring of Japan’s financial sector. 
iv The membership is not mutually exclusive. For example, Hitachi is affiliated with the President Clubs of 
Fuyo, Sanwa, and DKB. We would note that some large manufacturing firms such as Honda, Sony, and 
Panasonic do not hold membership. 
v Our approach of estimating the system of dynamic panel equations is in the spirit of Holtz-Eakin et al (1988), 
thereby using lagged values as instruments to generate orthogonality conditions on differenced data.. Notice that 
in the linear context we are working with, the 3SLS estimator can be derived as a GMM estimator from the 
orthogonality conditions implied by the set of instrument (see Theorem 5 in Cornwell et al , 1992) 
vi They find that horizontal keiretsu firms who hold President Club membership have a greater probability 
of engaging in FDI through mutual learning. 
